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1. Introduction 
 
This paper explores the effect of alimony on the gender division of labor, where 
alimony (or called as spousal support or spousal maintenance) is the amount of money 
one  spouse  pays  to  the  other,  by  court  order,  for  support  and  maintenance,  after 
divorce.  
According to  the literature of  gender division of labor, there are mainly three 
theoretical perspectives of the gender division of labor. The first is the gender-role 
ideology (e.g. Bird et al 1984; Kamo 1988; Ross 1987; Seccombe 1986). It suggests 
that men and women eternalize traditional sex roles to varying degrees depending 
upon their early life experiences. The resulting gender identities of people correlate 
with their sex-role expectations for themselves and others and become evident in their 
own behavior with respect to gender division of labor. The proposition is that the 
more deeply one or both partners has internalized the traditional sex role, the more 
likely the wife will be solely responsible for family work 
The second perspective focuses on the availability of time (e.g. Coverman 1985; 
England  and  Farkas  1986;  Hiller  1984).  It  considers  that  differences  in  spouses‟ 
participation in family work depend upon the ease with which either partner can do it, 
and ease is determined by time and skill.  If the amount of time available were a 
powerful predictor, one would expect a more equitable division of family work when 
wives are employed. 
The third perspective focuses on relative resources (e.g.  Blood and Wolf 1960; 
Brines 1994). It predicts that the partner with greater resources exhibits more power in 
the relationship. Power has been typically conceptualized as dominance in decision 
making, and resources have most often been considered to be education, occupation, 
and income. In later years, the same hypothesis has also been used to explain division 
of family work, in which it is posited that the partner bringing the relatively greater 
share  of  these  resources  to  the  marriage  can  minimize  his/her  participation  in 
household and child care duties. 
Besides the factors mentioned above, there are some other factors of the gender 
division  of  labor.  For  example,  according  to  South  and  Spitze‟s  (1994)  empirical 
evidences, in all situations, women spend more time than men doing housework, and 
the gender gap is widest among married persons. Moreover, the time women spend in 
doing  housework  is  higher  among  cohabitants  than  among  the  never-married,  is   3 
highest in marriage, and is lower among divorcees and widows. The empirical results 
show that marriage is a positive factor contributing to the gender division of labor.  
Why do married couples engage in division of labor? Our basic idea is that, on 
average, man and women are endowed with different comparative advantages, usually 
the male has comparative advantage in market or social production while the female 
in home production (interpreted to include child bearing and care). Fafchamps and 
Quisumbing (2003) find that intrahousehold gender division of labor is influenced by 
comparative  advantage  based  on  human  capital  and  by  long-lasting  returns  to 
learning-by-doing. Bardasi and Taylor (2008) find a statistically significant marital 
wage premium that can be attributed to productivity differences largely resulting from 
intra-household specialization or gender division of labour. Hersch and Stratton (1994) 
show  that,  even  in  the  situation  where  both  spouses  are  employed  full  time,  the 
husband‟s share of housework time is only 29%. In addition, the husband‟s share of 
housework time decreases significantly with his share of labor income and his share 
of labor-market hours. It implies that there is some gender division of labor according 
to  comparative  advantage,  though  not  quite  the  complete  division  of  labor  in  the 
traditional family. 
Although the division of labor enlarges the pie, it will reduce the female‟s threat 
point (the maximum utility in autarky) due to a lower accumulation of human capital 
(through learning by doing) in home compared to social production. This will put her 
in a disadvantage in the allocation of the family‟s output. This is the hold-up problem 
caused by the gender division of labor. For the long-term interest, the more bargaining 
power she will lose, the lower degree of division of labor she is willing to engage in. 
Since  alimony  can  be  prescribed  to  keep  the  couple‟s  bargaining  power  after  the 
division of labor, the hold–up problem is eliminated or at least reduced and hence the 
couple is willing to intensify the division of labor during cooperation. Thus, alimony 
has a useful function not only in achieving fairness in compensating the party who 
loses from engaging in home production with its lower accumulation of human capital 
but also in promoting a more efficient level of gender division of labor. The use of 
fore-gifts may also help but is shown to be inferior to alimony. 
There are some key points in this model. The first is how a family makes a 
decision about the production and output allocation? Some scholars (e.g. Becker 1991; 
Hadfield  1999)  assume  that  the  family  maximizes  a  joint  welfare  function  in 
allocation the family‟s production. But these models ignore the friction within the   4 
family. On the other hand, some scholars (e.g. Bergstrom 1996; Lundberg and Pollak 
1993 1994; and Weiss and Willis 1985) assume that the couple uses Nash bargaining 
to arrange the allocation of time and goods. Recently some dynamic Nash bargaining 
models (e.g. Baker and Jacobson 2007; Konrad and Lommerud 2000; and Vagstad 
2001) have been developed to explore the incomplete specialization in a family.  
In the vein of these dynamic models, we construct a two-period Nash bargaining 
model. Compared with these models, we contribute in several ways. First, previous 
models study the degree of specialization in education, which usually occurs before 
marriage; our model studies the degree of the division of labor during marriage or 
cohabitation.  
Next,  there are  “public  goods” models  of marriage (e.g.  Lundberg and Pollak 
1993 1994; Konrad and Lommerud 1995), in which marital surplus arises through the 
provision of public goods within marriage, while in the present model the surplus 
comes from the division of labor according to the endowed comparative advantage. 
We explain why the couple may choose a lower degree of division of labor against 
comparative advantage. According to Becker (1985, p37-38), there are differences 
between home production and social production in the contribution from specialized 
human capital to productivity. The tasks in home production are petty and scattered, 
thus the investment in human capital is dispersed to different tasks. While in social 
production, the mode of specialized production is widely used, thus the contribution 
of human capital to productivity is larger than that in home production. In this two-
period model, the productivity in period 2 is positively correlated with the producer‟s 
experience (learning by doing) in the industry, indexed by the time input in period 1. 
Since the difference in the contribution from experience to productivity, putting more 
effort  on  home  production  will  benefit  less  than  putting  more  effort  on  social 
production. It means that If the couple chooses (complete) specialization in period 1, 
the female will lose her bargaining power and hence the share of allocation in period 
2, though she will get more from a bigger pie in period 1. For the long-term interest 
the female may prefer a lower degree of division of labor in period 1.  
Third, alimony is embedded into the model for studying its effect on the division 
of labor. We show how the alimony increases the degree of the gender division of 
labor? We construct two models to study the division of labor between unmarried 
couples and married couples respectively. In the first model the loss of the unmarried 
female is compensated by fore-gift, which is paid before the division of labor. While   5 
in the second model the loss can be compensated by alimony, which is paid once the 
marriage  is  dissolved.  Compared  with  alimony,  fore-gift  has  lower  efficiency  in 
compensation, which shows in two aspects. First, before the division of labor, the lost 
is uncertain or even unknown, thus fore-gift can compensate the expected loss at best. 
Second, using the income today to compensate the loss tomorrow, it will inevitably 
distort the distribution of consumption in their lifetime, especially when the total loss 
is large. With higher efficiency in compensation, alimony may improve the degree of 
division of labor, and thus improve the Pareto efficiency of the family, making both 
sides better off. We ignore other complicating factors such as the in-family choice of 
specialization between investment for future and financing for current consumption of 
credit-constrained migrants (Cobb-Clark & Crossley 2004). 
This paper is organized as follows. Two models are presented in Section 2, which 
show the gender division of labor between unmarried couples and married couples 
respectively. Section 3 shows the effect of alimony on the gender division of labor. 





Assume that a family consists of two individuals, a male (M) and a female (F). 
There are two final goods, the social product (X) and the home product (Y). There are 
two periods, period 1 and period 2. In each period, an individual is endowed with one 
unit of time. For simplicity, we ignore the consumption of leisure and assume that all 
endowed time is used as inputs for production. 
There are two strategies in each period. The first is the strategy with low degree of 
division of labor (L), where each individual will use half unit of time in producing X 
and the other half unit of time in producing Y. The other is the strategy with high 
degree of division of labor (H), where an individual will use one unit of time in 
producing X, while the other will use one unit of time in producing Y. 
Assume that the male‟s production function of x is:  
            
1
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                                                                     (2.1)   6 
where A (>1) is the productivity, ʱ (>0) is the efficiency coefficient which represents 
the efficiency experience contributes to the productivity, lx1 and lx2 are the time input 
in the production of X in period 1 and period 2 respectively.  
Besides, his production function of y is:  
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                                                                                     (2.2) 
where ly1 and ly2 are the time input in the production of Y in period 1 and period 2 
respectively. 
For the female, on the other hand, the production function of x is:  
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And her production function of y is:  
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                                                                                  (2.4) 
      The production functions imply two assumptions. First, basing on Becker‟s (1985, 
p37-38) idea (mentioned in the introduction above), we assume that the productivity 
in social production increases more from experience than the productivity in home 
production does (ʱ>0).  Here, for simplicity, we simply assume that the productivity 
in home production does not increase from experience.  
Second,  we  assume  that  the  male  and  the  female  have  different  comparative 
advantages. On average, the male has comparative advantage  in social  production 
while the female in the home production. In this model coefficient A represents the 
degree of comparative advantage between the male and the female.  
Assume that the male and the female have the same utility function: 
             1 1 2 2 u x y Kx y                                                                                       (2.5) 
where xt and yt are respectively the amount of goods X and Y consumed in period t, 
and ʴ (0<ʴ<1) is the discount rate. The use of the same utility function shows that our 
results come from the issues analyzed rather than the difference in preference.                            
Because of the comparative advantage, both the male and the  female will benefit 
from the division of labor. As the price, they need to pay the coordination cost. In 
(2.5), index K (0<K≤1) denotes the coordination efficiency which presents the quality 
of  match  between  the  two  partners.  For  simplicity,  there  are  only  two  levels  in 
coordination  efficiency.  When  K=1  (without  any  coordination  cost),  people  will   7 
choose division of labor given comparative advantage. Thus it is reasonable to assume 
the  situation  of  K=k  (with  coordination  cost)  is  at  the  other  pole,  where  the 
coordination efficiency k is so low that people will choose autarky, no matter what 
they have done in period 1. 
We assume that the partners just know the distribution of K [see (2.6)] before 
period 2, but know the value of K in period 2.  
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According to Nash (1950), bargaining is decided by the optimum programming.  
             ( )( ) M M M F F F max Kx y f Kx y f                                                               (2.7) 
                 : ,  M F M F st x x x y y y      
where x and y are the products which will be divided by the two players. For i=M and 
F, xi and yi are the products that player i obtains from the bargaining, and fi are the 
threat  points  of  player  i  which  denotes  the  maximum  utility  from  autarky. 
Furthermore, for anyone, if the utility from the bargaining is less than the threat point, 
cooperation is not possible and hence players will choose autarky.  
 
Lemma 1 In Nash bargaining (2.7), we have 
            
,  if 
2








f Kxy f f
 
   
  
                                             (2.8a)  
            
,  if 
2








f Kxy f f
 
   
  
                                             (2.8b) 
where UM and UF are the utilities from the Nash bargaining. 
 
The proof of Lemma 1 is shown in Section 5. Lemma 1 shows that the couple will 
engage  in  the  gender  division  of  labor  if  and  only  if  (Kxy)
1/2≥fM+fF  is  satisfied. 
Otherwise they prefer autarky. As mentioned above, when K=k, we assume that k is 
so small that (kxy)
1/2<fM+fF, thus the players will prefer autarky. Besides, Lemma 1 
shows that the player with larger threat point will get more shares from the allocated 
goods. Only when the players have the same threat point, they allocate the goods 
equally.   8 
In this two-period model, the players engage in the Nash bargaining in each period. 
Since production in period 1 affect bargaining in period 2, and at the same time the 
bargaining in period 1 should takes the utilities from the subsequent bargaining in 
period 2 into account, we use backward deduction to analyze the bargaining in these 
two periods. In period 2, the form of the bargaining is the same as (2.7) in which the 
production in period 1 is given. In the Nash bargaining in period 1, they should take 
the utilities from the subsequent bargaining in period 2 into account. Thus the Nash 
bargaining is decided by the optimum programming:  
2 1 2 2 1 2 [( ) ( )][( ) ( )] M M M M M F F F F F max x y U f f x y U f f                                      
                 : ,  M F M F st x x x y y y                                                                          (2.9) 
where x and y are the products which will be divided by the two players. For i=M and 
F, xi and yi are the products that player i obtains from the bargaining. Ui2 is the utility 
the player  gets  from the subsequent  bargaining  in  period 2.  fi1 is  the utility from 
autarky in period 1 and fi2 is the utility from the subsequent bargaining in period 2.  
Nash bargaining (2.9) is a special case of bargaining (2.7), where the players‟ 
threat points are (2.10a) and (2.10b) respectively.   
1 2 2 M M M M f f f U                                                                                      (2.10a) 
1 2 2 F F F F f f f U                                                                                         (2.10b) 
From Lemma 1, we know the solutions of Nash bargaining (2.9). 
 
Corollary 1 In Nash bargaining (2.9) 
If  2 2 1 2 1 2 ( ) ( ) ( ) M F M M F F xy U U f f f f          , we have: 
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If  2 2 1 2 1 2 ( ) ( ) ( ) M F M M F F xy U U f f f f          , we have: 
12 M M M U f f                                                                                                      (2.12a) 
12 F F F U f f                                                                                                        (2.12b) 
where UM and UF are the present values of utilities from the Nash bargaining. 
   9 
Next we will analyze the gender division of labor between unmarried couple and 
married couple respectively. In the next section, we will compare the two situations 
from which the effect of marital contracts on the gender division of labor is shown. 
 
2.1 The gender division of labor between unmarried couple 
From backward deduction, we first analyze the Nash bargaining in period 2. The 
players can choose the high degree of division of labor (H) and the low degree of 
division of labor (L) in period 1.  
If the players choose L, each of them will input half unit of time in the production 
of X and the other half unit of time in the production of Y. In this case, the male‟s 
production functions in period 2 are: 
(1 0.5 ) x x A l    and  y yl                                                                          (2.13) 
And the female‟s production functions in period 2 are: 
(1 0.5 ) x xl    and  y y Al                                                                          (2.14) 
The production functions show that the male has comparative advantage in the 
production X. The male and the female will respectively specialize in the production 
of X and Y if they get larger utilities from bargaining than the utilities from autarky, 
otherwise they will choose autarky.  
For the utility maximization in autarky, the player will input half unit of time in 
the production of X and the other half unit of time in Y. thus the male‟ and the 








                                                                            (2.15) 
If the male and the female specialize in the production of X and Y respectively, 
the male will produce A(1+0.5ʱ) unit of X and the female will produce A unit of Y for 
allocation. There are two situations in period 2, they have high coordination efficiency 
(K=1) and low coordination efficiency (K=k).  In the case with  K=1, according to 
Lemma 1, they get larger utilities from the division of labor than that from autarky, 








                                                                           (2.16)   10 
In the case with K=k, on the other hand, since we assume that the coordination 
efficiency is so low that people will choose autarky. In this case they get the utilities 
(2.15). 
Now we analyze the Nash bargaining in period 1, which is in the form of optimum 
programming  (2.9).  From  Corollary  1  we  need  to  know  several  variables  before 
solving the programming. First, since the players choose L, each of them inputs half 
unit of time in the production of X and the other half unit of time in Y, they totally 
produce 0.5(1+A) units of X and 0.5(1+A) units of Y for allocation.  
Next, since the players in period 1 don‟t know the states but know the distribution 
[see (2.6)] of cooperation efficiency, thus they know the expected utilities from the 
bargaining in period 2: 
22
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 
                                        (2.17) 
Third, For the utility maximization in autarky, each players will input half unit of 
time in the production of X and the other half unit of time in Y. In this case, the 
players have the same threat point,  
11 0.5 MF f f A                                                                                         (2.18) 
The last is the utilities from the bargaining in period 2 consequent on autarky in 
period 1. Since the production times input in autarky are the same as in L, they have 
the same situations in period 2, and hence the expected utilities from the bargaining in 
period 2 are the same as the expected utilities in (2.17). 
22
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From Corollary 1 the present values of the utilities from the low degree of division 
of labor are: 
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After the analysis of the low degree of division of labor, we turn to the high 
degree of division of labor. The analyses are quite similar. 
If the players choose H, according to the comparative advantage in period 1, the 
male will input one unit of time in the production of X, while the female will input 
one unit of time in the production of Y. In this case, the male‟s production functions 
in period 2 are:   11 
(1 ) x x A l    and  y yl                                                                               (2.21) 
And the female‟s production functions in period 2 are: 
x xl   and  y y Al                                                                                         (2.22) 
From the production functions, the male will keep his comparative advantage in 
the production of X, and hence the male and the female will respectively specialize in 
the  production  of  X  and  Y  if  the  gender  division  of  labor  is  superior  to  autarky, 
otherwise they will choose autarky.  
For utility maximization in autarky, each player will input half unit of time in the 
production of X and the other half unit of time in Y. Thus the male‟ and the female‟s 











f                                                                                                      (2.23b) 
If the male and the female specialize in the production of X and Y respectively, 
the male will produce A(1+ʱ) unit of X and the female will produce A unit of Y for 
allocation. There are two situations in period 2, they have high coordination efficiency 
(K=1) and low coordination efficiency (K=k).  In the case with  K=1, according to 
Lemma  1,  they  get  higher  levels  of  utility  from  division  of  labor  than  that  from 
autarky, the utility levels from the bargaining are: 
21
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In the case with K=k, on the other hand, since we assume that the coordination 
efficiency is so low that people will choose autarky. In this case they get the utilities 
in (2.23). 
Now we analyze the Nash bargaining in period 1.  
From  Corollary  1  we  need  to  know  several  variables  before  solving  the 
programming. First, since the players choose H, the male will produce A unit of X and 
the female will produce A unit of Y for allocation.    12 
Next, since the players in period 1 don‟t know the states but know the distribution 
[see (2.6)] of cooperation efficiency, thus they know the expected utilities from the 
bargaining in period 2: 
2
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Last, as mention above, if the players choose autarky in period 1, the players‟ 
maximum utilities in period 1 (fM1 and fF1) are (2.18), and the expected utilities from 
the bargaining in period 2 (fM2 and fF2) are (2.19). 
From  Corollary  1  the  present  values  of  the  utilities  from  the  high  degree  of 
division of labor are: 
(1 ) 1
(1 ) [ ]
2 2 2 2 2
HM HF
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     
                            (2.26) 
In period 1, they choose low or high degree of division of labor just according to 
which strategy will bring them with larger utility. Compared (2.20) with (2.26), we 
have Proposition 1, where the proof is shown in Section 5. 
 
Proposition 1 without a marital contract, 
(1) The couple may choose the low degree (L) or the high degree of division of labor 
(H) in period 1. 
(2) The degree of gender division of labor increases with the degree of comparative 
advantage between the male and the female (A), and decreases with the divorce 
rate (p).  
 
2.2 The gender division of labor between a married couple 
As shown in Subsection 2.1, the female‟s bargaining power is reduced by the 
gender division of labor. If the players choose autarky in period 1, they have the same 
threat  point  in  the  bargaining  of  period  2  [see  (2.15)].  However,  if  they  choose 
specialization according the comparative advantage, the female has the lower threat 
point than the male [see (2.23a,b)]. This causes that in some situations the players will 
get  higher  utilities  from  autarky  than  that  from  specialization  in  accordance  to 
comparative advantage. In the next subsection we will analyze this problem further.   13 
In this subsection we introduce alimony, one of the legal provisions in marital 
contract,  for  the  compensation  of  the  loss  in  gender  division  of  labor.  Since  the 
players  have  the  same  threat  point  before  specialization,  we  assume  that  if  the 
cooperation is ceased the male needs to transfer part of income to the female until 
they have the same level of utility.  
Now we analyze the gender division of labor under the protection of alimony. In 
period 1 the male and the female may choose the low degree (L) or the high degree of 
division of labor (H). If the players choose L, they have the same threat point in 
period 2 [see (2.15)]. That means the female doesn‟t need alimony if the cooperation 
is ceased. It is the same as the situation without marriage, thus their present values of 
utilities from the adoption of low degree of division of labor are (2.20).  
If the players choose H, according to the comparative advantage in period 1, the 
male will input one unit of time in the production of X, while the female will input 
one unit of time in the production of Y. In this case, the male‟s and the female‟ 
production functions in period 2 are (2.21) and (2.22) respectively. 
From the production functions, the male will keep his comparative advantage in 
the production of X, and hence the male and the female will respectively specialize in 
the production of X and Y if the gender division of labor is more beneficial than 
autarky, otherwise they will choose autarky.  
For utility maximization in autarky, each player will input half unit of time in the 
production of X and the other half unit of time in Y. if there is no compensation, the 
male  and  the  female‟s  utilities  are  (2.23a)  and  (2.23b)  respectively.  Under  the 
protection of alimony, we assume that the male has to transfer c unit of income to the 
female from which they have the same utility. Thus c satisfies: 
(1 ) 1 1
( ) ( )













                                                                                               (2.29) 
and the male‟ and the female‟s threat points are respectively: 









                                                                          (2.30) 
If the male and the female specialize in the production of X and Y respectively, 
the male will produce A(1+ʱ) unit of X and the female will produce A unit of Y for 
allocation. There are two situations in period 2, they have high coordination efficiency   14 
(K=1) and low coordination efficiency (K=k).  In the case with  K=1, according to 
Lemma 1, they get larger utilities from division of labor than that from autarky, the 








                                                                                (2.31) 
In the case with K=k, on the other hand, since we assume that the coordination 
efficiency is so low that people will choose autarky. In this case they get the utilities 
in (2.23). 
Now we analyze the Nash bargaining in period 1. From Corollary 1 we need to 
know  several  variables  before  solving  the  programming.  First,  since  the  players 
choose H, the male will produce A unit of X and the female will produce A unit of Y 
for allocation.  
Next, since the players in period 1 don‟t know the states but know the distribution 
[see (2.6)] of cooperation efficiency, thus they know the expected utilities from the 
bargaining in period 2: 
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                                     (2.32) 
Last, as mentioned above, if the players choose autarky in period 1, the players‟ 
maximum utilities in period 1 (fM1 and fF1) are (2.18), and the expected utilities from 
the bargaining in period 2 (fM2 and fF2) are (2.19). 
From Corollary 1 the players‟ present values of the utilities from the high degree 
of division of labor are: 
1 [1 (1 )]
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2 2 2 1
MX MY
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                         (2.33) 
In period 1, the players will choose the low or the high degree of division of labor 
according to which strategy will bring them a higher level of utility. Comparing (2.20) 
with (2.33) we have Proposition 2, where the proof is shown in Section 5. 
 
Proposition 2 With marriage the male and the female always choose the high degree 
of division of labor in period 1.  
 
3. Alimony and the gender division of labor 
 
3.1 The effect of hold up on the gender division of labor   15 
There is a „hold up‟ problem caused by the gender division of labor. The male and 
the  female  are  endowed  with  comparative  advantage,  usually  the  male  has 
comparative advantage in social production while the female in home production. 
That  is  why in various  degrees there is  the  gender division  of labor in a  family. 
Although the division of labor enlarges the pie, it will reduce the female‟s threat point 
(the maximum utility in autarky) and hence put her in a disadvantage in the allocation 
of the family‟s output. This is the „hold up‟ problem caused by the gender division of 
labor.  
On the other hand, hold up impacts negatively on the gender division of labor. 
From the long-term interest, it is the balance of these two factors, the more reward 
from a larger pie and the less share of allocation in the future, in determining the 
division of labor. Given other conditions, the more bargaining power she will lose, the 
lower degree of division of labor she is willing to engage in. 
There  are  some  methods  for  eliminating  or  at  least  mitigating  the  „hold  up‟ 
problem caused by the gender division of labor, for example, customary (Lundberg 
and Pollak 1993, Baker and Jacobsen 2007), and social norm (Sevilla-Sanz 2005). 
Here we just compare two methods, fore-gift and alimony.  
Paid before the division of labor for compensating the cumulative total loss in a 
lifetime, fore-gift is a method for eliminating the „hold up‟ problem. In this model, for 
example,  the  couple  knows  that  the  female  will  suffer  loss  if  they  engage  in  the 
division of labor in period 1. Thus when they engage a bargaining for the time and 
goods allocation in period 1, the female will get some compensation for the expected 
loss caused by the division of labor. This is the fore-gift. As a result, the couple has 
the same expected present value of utilities, no matter there is or not the division of 
labor between them. It means that the „hold up‟ problem is eliminated.  
Alimony is one of the legal provisions in marital contract. Since alimony can be 
prescribed to keep the couple‟s bargaining power after the gender division of labor, 
the „hold up‟ problem is eliminated. In this model, for example, the couple has the 
same bargaining power before the division of labor. Once the cooperation is ceased, 
alimony can be prescribed as follow: the male needs to transfer part of income to the 
female until they have the same utility. In this case, they have the same threat point 
after the division of labor, thus the output of the family will be allocated equally. 
Since  the  „hold  up‟  problem  is  eliminated,  the  couple  is  willing  to  intensify  the 
division of labor during cooperation (see Proposition 2).    16 
Now we compare the effects of alimony and fore-gift on the gender division of 
labor.  
 
Proposition  3 Compared with a fore-gift, the introduction of an alimony will not 
reduce the degree of gender division of labor. In some situations it will improve the 
degree of division of labor, and thus improve Pareto efficiency. 
 
The proof is shown in Section 5. Proposition 3 shows that alimony is a more 
effective  method  than  fore-gifts  for  promoting  the  division  of  labor.  The  lower 
efficiency of fore-gifts shows in two aspects: First, a fore-gift compensates the loss 
before the division of labor. Since the loss is uncertain or even unknown at that time, 
they can only compensate the expected loss at best, while alimony is confirmed at the 
time of divorce, when the information of the loss is revealed. For periodic support, the 
payment can be modified according to the situation of the time.  
Next, with a fore-gift, the cumulative total loss in a lifetime is compensated before 
the  division  of  labor.  When  the  total  loss  is  large,  it  will  inevitably  distort  the 
distribution  of  consumption  in  their  lifetime.  While  with  alimony,  say  periodic 
support, ideally the loss is measured and compensated in each period: the larger the 
difference in threat points, the more income is transferred. In this case, the difference 
in the utility levels between the couple is eliminated by averaging their incomes, not 
by distorting their income.  
The higher efficiency in compensation, the less Pareto efficiency is discounted. 
Compared with fore-gifts, therefore, alimony may improve the degree of division of 
labor, and thus improve the Pareto efficiency. 
 
3.2 The reasons of alimony 
What  is  the  reason  of  alimony?  From  an  investigation  in  1997,  65%  of  the 
interviewees believed that the alimony should be paid until the needed spouse “on 
feet”, 20% believed it should be paid until the needed spouse re-partner, and 5% said 
it  was  indefinite  (Behrens  and  Smyth  1999,  Table  8).  It  means  that  most  people 
emphasize the function of temporal support in alimony. Consistent with this general 
opinion is the remarriage-termination rule, which makes remarriage as a significant or 
dispositive indicator for termination of alimony (Starnes 2006, p973).   17 
If only temporal support is given in an alimony, it may be unreasonable in some 
cases.  For example, in the case of Helen and Anthony (Starnes 2006 p974), they 
divorce after a marriage of twenty-six years. During marriage, Helen worked as a full-
time homemaker and  caretaker of the  couple‟s  children while Anthony pursued a 
career.  At  divorce,  Anthony  earned  $158,000  annually  as  a  bank  executive  while 
Helen qualified for only unskilled, entry level positions at minimum wage. A divorce 
decree divided the couple's marital property; ordered Anthony to pay $500 per week 
in alimony and $300 per week in child support; and set Helen and Anthony free to 
begin new lives as single persons. Helen soon found work as a part-time medical 
assistant earning $90 per week. One and one-half years later, Helen married again, 
and upon Anthony's petition, a court terminated her alimony.  
Is it fair for Helen? Although people believe that an ex-husband should not pay for 
a former spouse who has married someone else, it is obviously unequal between the 
alimony  for  1.5  years  and  the  opportunity  costs  of  a  full-time  homemaker  and 
caretaker for 26 years. We have shown that the huge difference in earning power is, at 
least partly, caused by the gender division of labor during their marriage. For this 
reason, Helen should get compensation for her loss, whether she remarry or not.  
Totally  stopping  alimony  payments  after  a  divorced  women  remarries  causes 
inefficiency in two ways. First, it reduces the incentives for a woman to engage in 
efficient division of labour during marriage as her alimony will only last until she 
remarries. If the amount of alimony payment is determined at an appropriate level 
assuming no remarriage, the termination at remarriage will reduce the appropriate 
expected utility of engaging in efficient division of labor. Moreover, the losing parties 
from the remarriage-termination rule are not confined to directly affected persons like 
Helen, but to all families. If a young wife believes that the expected compensation 
cannot  cover  her  loss  from  the  gender  division  of  labor,  she  will  put  excessive 
(compared to efficient division of labor) effort into the career of social production 
instead  of  into  the  family.  Therefore,  the  family  will  suffer  welfare  loss  due  to 
insufficient division of labor.  
Secondly, the remarriage-termination rule causes inefficiencies as it discourages 
divorced women with alimony payments from efficient remarriage due to the loss of 
alimony. Many women with alimony payments may refrain from efficient and happy 
marriages. Thus, the remarriage-termination rule, especially in its total termination 
aspect, is likely to be inefficient and unjustified.   18 
Consider a situation where two persons A and B became partners in a business 
with equal contribution of capital investment. After a number of years, they decided 
to terminate the partnership. Due to the fact that A contributed more in terms of time 
investment in looking after the business, it was decided to have a 60-40 split of the 
assets  of the business.  Surely, if this  split  is  reasonable, it should not depend on 
whether A starts another business in the future or not. 
From the analyses above we argue that the compensation for the loss caused by 
the gender division of labor should be a reason of alimony and that the termination of 




The paper develops a two-period Nash bargaining model to explain a phenomenon: 
the gender division of labor between a married couple is more intensive than that 
between a unmarried couple (South and Spitze 1994).  
The  basic  idea  is  that,  the  male  and  the  female  have  different  comparative 
advantages, usually the male has comparative advantage in the production of social 
products while the female in the production of housework. Although the division of 
labor enlarges the pie, it will reduce the female‟s threat point (the maximum utility in 
autarky) and hence put her in a disadvantage in the allocation of the family‟s output. 
This is the „hold up‟ problem caused by the gender division of labor. From the long-
term interest, the more bargaining power she will lose, the lower degree of division of 
labor she is willing to engage in. Since alimony can be prescribed to keep the couple‟s 
bargaining power after the division of labor, the „hold up‟ problem is eliminated and 
hence the couple is willing to intensify the division of labor during cooperation. 
As an application we discuss the reasons for alimony. Today alimony  will be 
terminated if the former spouse remarries someone else. It is not only the general 
opinion but also a rule in marriage law, remarriage-termination rule. From the case of 
Helen (Starnes 2006), we argue that (temporal) support should not be the only reason 
of alimony, compensation for the loss caused by the gender division of labor should 
be another reason. We also argue that the remarriage-termination rule is inefficient in 
both  causing  insufficient  division  of  labour  within  marriage  and  in  discouraging 
divorced women with alimony payments from efficient remarriage.   19 
However, from this model, the alimony loses its base in the absence of division of 
labor. For example, if a couple keeps their occupations and shares all the housework 
equally (for simplicity we assume that they have no children), no alimony is needed 
upon the dissolution of the family, though alimony from other reasons (Cohen 1987, 





Lemma 1 Proof:  
The maximization (2.7) is equivalent to 
max{ln( ) ln[ ( )( ) ]} M M M M M F Kx y f K x x y y f       
:0 , 0 MM st x x y y      
Thus we have the first-order conditions: 
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( )( ) M M M M M F Kx y f K x x y y f                                                              (5.2) 
Denoting xM=λx, from (5.1) we have yM=λy. And from (5.2) we have: 
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where UM and UF are the utilities from the Nash bargaining. 
 
Proposition 1 Proof:  
From (2.20) and (2.26), we have 
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     
It  is  easy  to  see  that  the  players  may  choose  the  low  or  the  high  degrees  of 
division of labor. For example, when devoice rate (p) approach to zero, utility ULF is 
larger than utility UHF. In this case, they will choose low degree of division of labor. 
In  contrast,  when  the  degree  of  comparative  advantage  (A)  and  devoice  rate  (p) 
approach to one, utility UHF is larger than utility ULF. In this case, they will choose 
high degree of division of labor. 
From (5.3), it is easy to see that UHF-ULF increases with A, but decreases while p 
increase. Therefore, the larger the A, the more likely UHF>ULF. In addition, the larger 
the p, the more likely ULF>UHF. It means that the degree of comparative advantage (A) 
is a positive factor, while devoice rate (p) is an inverse factor of the gender division of 
labor.  
 
Proposition 2 Proof:  
With A≥1, we have: 














It is easy to see that (2.33) is larger than (2.20). Thus we have Proposition 2. 
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